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Abstract
This paper analyses the Western Balkan countries’ relationship towards the instrument of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the context of the measures undertaken by 
Brussels against the Russian Federation due to its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. In this regard, 
the author first points out to what extent the countries of the Western Balkans over the past few 
years, that is, after the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, harmonized their 
foreign policies with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Certainly, the 
most important foreign policy challenges for the Western Balkan countries in 2014 are imposing 
sanctions against the Russian Federation.
Some Western Balkan countries (above all, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), 
according to the author’s assessment, are stretched between their intentions to join the EU and thus 
harmonize their foreign policy with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union 
on one hand, and on the other, to avoid disruption of existing relations with the Russian Federation.
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Introduction
Contemporary global politics demonstrates that all attempts to 
incorporate certain global trends into existing “drawers” of different 
theoretical directions can hardly offer comprehensive explanations. The 
gap between different approaches can be seen in the example of the 
current Ukrainian crisis and the harmonization of foreign policy of the 
Western Balkan countries with the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the European Union (EU). The institutional approach, for example, 
has convincingly explained the formation of the European Union and its 
nearly seven decades long evolution showing that institutions and specific 
policy processes may be adequate frameworks for the positioning of this 
organization on a continental and global scale (Peters 2007: 223). The EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy has been built for more than two 
decades and it has become an articulate voice of the Member States 
towards third countries (Baker 2011: 343–358). However, if one examines 
its effectiveness in solving crises in the EU’s neighbourhood, in particular 
in the case of the recent Ukrainian crisis, one can conclude that it has 
not been too effective, and that sanctions against the Russian Federation 
have not yielded the desired results related to stabilization.
The Ukrainian crisis also shows that realism has not lost its historical battle 
with other theories of international relations (liberalism, constructivism, 
critical approach, etc.), as was often emphasized in the post-Cold War 
period (Waltz 1979 / Novičić 2007: 211–242). This theoretical approach 
points to the newly induced security threats and the drive for dominance 
among global powers (Donnelly 2013: 276). Thus, smaller countries are 
trying to position themselves through either ‘distancing’ or ‘inclining’ to 
the world’s centres of power (The Editors, The Nation 2014). Such attempt 
are observed through declarations of some Western Balkan countries 
regarding the Ukrainian crisis in the context of the adaptation and 
harmonization of their foreign policy with the CFSP, which represents an 
obligation in the course of European integration (Rynning 2011: 23–42).
The Ukrainian crisis, which began in early 2014, caused predominantly by 
the neighbouring Russian Federation to prevent closer bonding of Ukraine 
with the European Union, contains certain characteristics identical to the 
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Yugoslav crisis, i.e. primarily the Bosnian War (1991–1995). Ukraine’s territory 
is pray to Russian ambitions (the annexation of the Crimea in early March 
2014) and plans of the pro-Russian separatists in the eastern parts of the 
country (the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk). 
Although the Ukrainian Parliament passed a bill on the special status of 
these areas on 16 September 2014 (Minsk Protocol 2014), it became clear 
that this would not satisfy the interests of the Russian separatists in these 
areas. At the same time, the European Parliament and the Ukrainian Rada 
adopted the Agreement on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union 
(Blic 2014a), which the Russian Federation clearly opposes and constantly 
demands its change (EU – Ukraine Association Agreement 2014).
The threat of further dissolution of Ukraine, which has been directly 
instigated by the neighbouring Russian Federation, remains. However, a 
certain disorientation of other actors is also evident — that of the United 
States and the European Union to first prevent this conflict, and then to 
influence the reduction of open defiance of the neighbouring Russian 
Federation. Everything that the European Union has undertaken in relation 
to the crisis in Ukraine, by introducing several “rounds of sanctions” (Europa.
EU 2014a) against the Russian Federation, has been shown as insufficient 
for this country to completely abandon its hegemonic ambitions. Instead, 
Ukraine will remain a very unstable country that will not be able to realize 
its leading foreign policy goal — accession to the European Union. Other 
post-Soviet countries can face a situation similar to the Ukrainian one due 
to the growing ambitions of the Russian Federation (Blair 2014).
As a result of growing tensions between the West and the East — the 
USA and the EU on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the 
other, some Western Balkan countries reconsidered their previously 
established foreign policy course. This primarily applies to Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent to Macedonia. At the 
same time, in response to the Ukrainian crisis, Montenegro, Albania and 
Kosovo confirmed their pro-European foreign policy course. Supporting 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, they 
have shown that they would continue to be predictable and reliable 
partners. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia face problems of 
potential separatism, and therefore waver in relation to the direct support 
to the CFSP concerning the activities of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. 
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Leaders of the Republic Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina often point out 
the possibility of a referendum on the status of this entity, while recently 
in Macedonia, after more than two decades, the so-called Republic of 
Illirida was “proclaimed” in the territories predominantly populated by 
Albanians.1 
At the same time, the Russian Federation, for the umpteenth time, noted 
that the expansion of NATO to the rest of the Western Balkans represents 
a provocation against this country.2 In this context, it was pointed out to 
Montenegro that, keeping in mind its aspirations to become a member 
of NATO, Russia would not look favourably at that, but would consider it a 
“provocation” (Kajošević 2014). At the same time, the conflict in Ukraine 
continues, despite the Minsk peace agreement. “Misunderstanding” 
between the Russian Federation and the EU and the USA continues. The 
Western Balkan countries face a challenge whether they would remain 
consistent with earlier proclaimed pro-European foreign policy goals.
The Western Balkans between future EU 
membership and the ongoing Ukrainian crisis 
a) The Current Situation Regarding European Integration in the Western 
Balkans 
The six subjects — countries and entities in the Western Balkan region, 
after Croatia’s accession to the European Union at the beginning of July 
2013, are still far from full membership, but their basic foreign policy goal 
is membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, 
1 The President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik, during the last five years, has repeatedly claimed he would 
call a referendum on the status of this Bosnian and Herzegovinian entity. This was particularly topical during 2014 in 
the context of the referendum in the Crimea, as well as an unsuccessful referendum in Scotland in September. At the 
same time, in Macedonia in mid-September 2014 the so-called Republic of Illirida was again declared in the northwest 
part of the country inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Similar attempts were made in 1992, but this creation never lived.
2 See: The Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, given to the Sarajevo daily 
newspaper Dnevni avaz — Avdović, E., 2014. Šef ruske diplomatije Sergej Lavrov za ‛Avaz’: Moskva protiv NATO-a 
na Balkanu. Dnevni avaz, [online] 29 September. Available at:   http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/138045/sef-ruske-
diplomatije-sergej-lavrov-za-avaz-moskva-protiv-nato-a-na-balkanu [accessed 14 October 2014]. Quote — “When 
asked how Moscow looks at the possibility of further rapprochement of the Western Balkan regions, or the prospect of 
accession of Montenegro, Macedonia and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina in full membership in NATO, (Sergey) 
Lavrov has openly said that Moscow sees it as wrong policy and provocations by the North Atlantic military alliance.“
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with the exception of the Republic of Serbia (Đukanović 2010: 295–313). 
This pro-European and Euro-Atlantic shift in foreign policy of Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia began mostly at the beginning of the 
last decade and resulted in Albania becoming a member of NATO (2009), 
and Montenegro (Jovićević 2014) and Macedonia are approaching this 
status.3 When one looks at the effects of the fifteen year long process of 
stabilization and association, established in 2000, one can see that there 
are obvious improvements in almost all countries of the region (Ateljević 
2005: 7–32). This approach towards the Western Balkan countries helped 
to open up the prospect of a European future and reduced viewing EU 
membership as a utopian goal. Croatia, as the most successful regional 
example, managed to start and complete the negotiation process 
(2005–2011), and become a member of the European Union (2013), thus 
becoming a “role model” for other countries of the Western Balkans south 
of the rivers Sava and Danube (Lopandić 2013: 7–20). 
In the meantime, the progress of other countries in the region also 
followed. Currently, four Western Balkan countries, with the exception of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, acquired the status of candidate 
for membership, and the negotiation process began with Montenegro 
and Serbia.4 Macedonia acquired candidate status in 2005, and was then 
significantly ahead of the rest of the region. However, after no agreement 
was reached between Macedonia and neighbouring Greece regarding 
the name of the country, both its approach to membership in the EU 
(2005) and NATO (2008) was stopped. Albania has waited for quite a long 
time (from 2009 until June 2014) to be granted candidate status, but as 
of recently it made evident progress due to internal reforms (Europa.EU 
2014b). In this regard, the new government in Tirana with Edi Rama as 
Prime Minister, formed in mid-2013, failed to accelerate these reforms and 
gain the trust of the administration in Brussels. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been spinning for more than two decades 
in the “vicious circle” of solving the so-called national issues of Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs, and is suffering due to the deep dysfunction of state 
3  Macedonia’s membership in NATO was blocked by neighboring Greece at the Summit in Bucharest in 2008. On the 
other hand, Montenegro is expected  to receive an invitation for membership in NATO in 2015, after the summit in 
Wales in September this year, where it was stated that it can become a member before the next summit in Warsaw. 
4  Montenegro started membership talks with the European Union on 29 June 2012, and Serbia on 21 January 2014. So 
far, Montenegro has opened chapters 5, 6, 7, 10, 20, 23 and 24, and closed chapters 25 and 26. 
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structures and institutions (Đukanović and Jovanović 2014: 59–80). Since 
2001, all attempts to change this state have not yielded any results. Yet, 
such constitutionally established Bosnia and Herzegovina is not credible in 
terms of taking over potential obligations from the EU or NATO, because 
there are no adequate institutional frameworks and capacities to adopt 
and implement the obligations which stem from the accession processes 
(Miljuš and Đukanović 2011: 187–232). In 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but this document 
did not enter into force.
At the same time, Kosovo5, after the declaration of independence in 
2008, was first and foremost focused on accelerating the process of its 
recognition, whereas European integration was a part of another foreign 
policy plan (Zejneli 2014). However, it should be noted that since 2012, a 
feasibility study was obtained, and completion of negotiations regarding 
the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement is soon 
expected (Europa.EU 2014c). It should also be emphasized that Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain, Slovakia and Romania, as member states of the European 
Union, have not recognized Kosovo’s independence, which will certainly 
complicate its joining this organization in the future. At the same time, 
the strengthening of right-wing political parties in Kosovo in the general 
elections of June 2014, especially the movement “Self-Determination” 
and potential forming of ruling coalitions by euro-sceptic subjects, may 
jeopardize its path towards membership in the EU, as well as block 
the resumption of negotiations on political issues with the authorities in 
Belgrade (Đukanović 2013: 365–385 / Radio Slobodna Evropa — Balkanski 
servis 2014a).
b) The Harmonization of Foreign Policy with the EU’s CFSP: General 
Framework and Past Experience
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, as candidate countries 
for membership in the European Union, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, are obliged 
to harmonize their foreign policies with the Common Foreign and Security 
5 “Kosovo“, under the agreement achieved during the dialogue between Priština and Belgrade (2012), indicates the 
use of a separate footnote with the following text - “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is 
in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence”.
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Policy of the European Union after and during the process of negotiations 
(Simić 2013: 17–41). The European Commission overlooks the harmonization 
of foreign policies of candidate countries with the CFSP (Istraživački tim 
Centra za spoljnu politiku 2014: 1–10). Therefore, how candidate countries 
follow EU policy towards third countries and international organizations is 
very important, as well as how much they internalize the acquis relating 
to this area (Ibid: 9–10). The CFSP determines the general criteria of 
foreign policy of the European Union, as well as the possibility to introduce 
restrictive measures against third countries. The CFSP developed into one 
of the leading and most recognizable instruments of the European Union. 
It deals with enlargement policy, relations with the Eastern Partnership, 
the Mediterranean, the influential countries of the world, as well as the 
participation of countries in international organizations (Ibid: 1–10). The 
CFSP implies certain legal acts such as communications, decisions of 
the Council and the European Council, the political declarations, the 
harmonization of common actions, etc. (Ibid: 9–10). It also includes 
the introduction of sanctions and restrictive measures, measures to 
prevent conflicts, non-proliferation (of small arms and light weapons as 
well as weapons of mass destruction), cooperation with international 
organizations and participation in peacekeeping missions under the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (Ibid: 9–10).
Almost identical conditions related to the harmonization of foreign policy 
of candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, as well as other 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, have shown that these chapters 
— today under number 31, and earlier under 27 - were quickly opened 
and closed, and that they did not represent a significant obstacle in 
the negotiations (Ibid: 7–9). It is interesting that none of the 12 countries 
asked for transitional arrangements related to this chapter, or for delays 
of internalization of regulations in the area of CFSP (Ibid: 8). These 
negotiations were opened with Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Cyprus in the first half of 1999, and with Slovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta in the first half of 2000 (Ibid: 8). With 
the exception of Romania and Bulgaria, all negotiations were temporarily 
closed in the first half of 2000, until they were finally closed in December 
2002 (Ibid: 8). Negotiations on this chapter (CFSP) with Romania and 
Bulgaria were temporarily closed in the first half of 2000, and definitely in 
December 2004 (Ibid: 7–9).
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The case of the Republic of Croatia is similar. After leaving the Yugoslav 
Federation in 1991 it was faced with a search for its place in international 
relations and it began the process of European integration only at the 
end of the 1990s (Đukanović 2010: 295–313). It should be stressed that in 
this process Croatia managed to establish a good basis for a “strategic 
partnership” with the United States, which ultimately resulted in its 
membership in the EU (2013), and four years earlier in the North Atlantic 
Alliance (Ibid: 295–313). Croatia opened negotiations on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy in October 2010, which were then temporarily 
closed only two months later — on 22 December 2010 (Istraživački tim 
Centra za spoljnu politiku 2014: 9). 
b) The Western Balkans between the West and the East — Harmonization 
with the EU’s CFSP and/or Strengthening of Russian Influence?
After the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, the Western Balkan countries 
find themselves between obligation to harmonize their foreign policy with 
the CFSP and the (re)emergence of the Russian influence in the region, 
especially with respect to energy dependency. The majority of these 
countries had no negative experiences with the Soviet Union, with the 
exception of Albania, because due to the Yugoslav leadership break with 
Stalin in 1948 and later in the framework of the non-aligned movement, the 
influence of the Soviet Union was restricted. This “justifies” both the attempt 
to approach the Russian Federation (Serbia), and restraint towards its 
current foreign policy activities (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia). 
Before the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, the level of harmonization 
of foreign policy of countries in the region with the CFSP was high and 
indicated that in future negotiations with the European Union this chapter 
would not be problematic. Moreover, they all gradually made progress 
which the EU noticed and clearly indicated in their annual progress reports. 
When analyzing the progress reports for the last four years (2011–2014), 
one can see that the level of harmonization was high, with the exception 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One also observes that during 2014, due to 
the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and Europe’s introduction of restrictive 
measures against Russia, this percentage decreased noticeably when it 
comes to Serbia and Macedonia.
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After gaining independence in 2006, Montenegro managed to position itself 
in the Western Balkans as a sort of “meeting place”, thanks to its well-preserved 
multi-ethnic structure and complexity of its own Mediterranean and Western 
Balkan identity (Ministarstvo inostranih poslova Republike Crne Gore 2006). 
Montenegro defined Euro-Atlantic integrations as its goal and top priority 
even in its Constitution (Preamble, Para. 5). Montenegro will perhaps become 
a member of NATO in 2015 despite the aforementioned objections from the 
Russian Federation, that is, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.6 Russia has 
repeatedly tried to prevent the entry of the Western Balkan countries into 
NATO, and this especially applies to Montenegro where Russian capital has 
become very important for the local economy.
Montenegro’s progress reports from 2011 to 2014 show that the level 
of harmonization of its foreign policy with the CFSP annually ranged 
between 99% and 100% (European Commission 2011c: 72–73 / European 
Commission 2012c: 61–62 / European Commission 2013c: 53–54 / European 
Commission 2014c: 56–57). Therefore, when it comes to the harmonization 
of foreign policy with the CFSP, there should be no major problems. 
Montenegro has started screening in Chapter 31 (CFSP) on 17 May 2013, 
and bilateral screening was closed on 27 June of the same year. In late 
June 2014, this negotiation chapter was opened.
Montenegro followed the restrictive measures of the European Union 
against the Russian Federation, despite the evident danger of reciprocal 
measures that would jeopardize the considerable export of food products 
and wines from this country (Blic 2014b). In this regard, it is important to 
point out that Montenegro was among the first countries in the region 
that publicly opposed the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian 
Federation in mid-March 2014. However, in the progress report for 2014, it 
is stated that Montenegro is late to adopt the law on the introduction of 
restrictive measures (European Commission 2014c: 57). At the same time, 
the positive role of Montenegro in the work of international organizations 
was pointed out, as well as its measures to adopt the amendments to 
6 See the reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Montenegro to the statement by Sergey 
Lavrov about the membership of this country as a “threat” to Russia — Pobjeda 2014. MVPEI: Crna Gora ima jasno 
spoljnopolitičko opredjeljenje, to Rusija zna. [online] 1 October. Available at:   http://www.pobjeda.me/2014/10/01/
mvpei-crna-gora-ima-jasno-spoljnopoliticko-opredjeljenje-rusijazna/#.VCw8LVf-67o [accessed 14 October 2014]. 
Quote - “Montenegro has a clear foreign policy orientation, which is in line with national interests and was repeatedly 
stated in talks with Russian officials and officials of other countries. Russia’s position in relation to the expansion of the 
Alliance is also very well known. Montenegro will continue to build relationships and develop cooperation with Russia 
in the spirit of traditional friendship, trust and mutual interest, with the sovereign right of both states to opt for courses 
of internal development and foreign policy orientation.“
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legal solutions relating to the classification of confidential information. The 
same applies to this country’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions 
in Somalia, Afghanistan and Cyprus, as well as in the EU military missions in 
Mali and the Central African Republic (Ibid: 57).
In relation to the situation in Ukraine, Albania almost entirely followed 
the European Union. In the period from 2011 to 2014 the level of 
harmonization of its foreign policy with the EU ranged from 95% to 100% 
(European Commission 2011a: 65–66 / European Commission 2012a:  65–
66 / European Commission 2013: 55–56 / European Commission 2014a: 
59–60). Thus, on 20 March 2014, Albania imposed sanctions against the 
Russian Federation, and it now completely follows the United States and 
the European Union on this issue. As in the case of Montenegro, after the 
commencement of negotiations on membership in the European Union, 
it is not realistic to expect that Albania will have significant problems in 
relation to Chapter 31, that is, CFSP.
Kosovo still has not signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement and 
did not have a formal obligation to fully follow the guidelines of the CFSP. 
However, it has condemned the actions of the Russian Federation in the 
Crimea in early March 2014. The announcement of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Kosovo of 2 March 2014 stated that it condemns the “occupation 
of Ukrainian territory, and the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pristina, 2014b). However, 
this statement was published exclusively on the English page of the official 
site and not on the Serbian and Albanian ones. Numerous later statements 
of the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo had a similar tone. On 17 
September 2013, the Kosovo Government introduced sanctions against 
the Russian Federation, thus joining the European Union’s position. All 
these activities leave an optimistic impression that the harmonization of 
Kosovo’s foreign policy with the EU in future negotiations will not constitute 
a significant challenge to its “European path”. A significant problem might 
be the eventual resumption of dialogue with the authorities in Belgrade, 
in the context of the announcements that the leader of the right-wing 
movement “Self-Determination”, Albin Kurti, will be the main negotiator of 
Kosovo in this process. Therefore, in the following period the EU will insist on 
the revival and effectiveness of dialogue with the authorities in Belgrade.
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When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and in particular 
Serbia, it can be noted that 2014 brought additional concerns in their foreign 
policy orientation, because they, in spite of an earlier generally favourable 
evaluation by the European Union in relation to the harmonization of their 
foreign policy with the EU’s CFSP, have not joined the restrictive measures 
undertaken by the Union successively since March 2014 against the Russian 
Federation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a country that is de facto constitutionally 
blocked and deeply ethnically divided, has failed to speed up the process of 
European integration (Đukanović 2008: 37–44). It did not harmonize its foreign 
policy legally or practically with the EU’s CFSP. In this context, reports on the 
progress of BiH towards membership in the EU state that during 2011, 2012, 
2013 and 2014, the  compliance of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with the CFSP was 68%, 58%, 66% and 52% (European Commission 2011b: 5 / 
European Commission 2012b: 7 / European Commission 2013b: 6 / European 
Commission 2014b: 6). One should add the permanent foreign policy 
disagreements between the members of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina on certain international issues (independence of Kosovo 
— 2008, the status of Palestine in the United Nations — 2012, etc.), as well as 
the fact that the strategic foreign policy document of this country is largely 
out-dated since it was adopted in 2003 (Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine 
2003).
The Presidency of BiH adopted the “Declaration on the political situation 
in Ukraine” on 6 March 2014 (Predsjedništvo BiH 2014) which contains only 
general calls for peace and the peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian crisis, 
but lacks any sort of condemnation of the role of the Russian Federation 
in these events. However, the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Zlatko Lagumdžija, mitigated this by underlining the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine (SRNA 2014). However, when voting in the United Nations 
on the resolution on maintaining the so-called referendum on the island of 
Crimea in late March 2014, BiH Ambassador Mirsada Čolaković walked out of 
the voting room (N.N. 2014). When one considers the future internal relations 
after the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were held on 
12 October 2014, it is clear that the depth of its (tri-)ethnic division will remain 
unchanged or will even deepen, and that there will be no acceleration of 
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European integration in the period to come.7 
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributes to the fact that the 
official Russian Federation is developing very close relations with the current 
President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik, who uses all potentials of 
the Dayton Agreement to stop the formulation of a truly pro-European and 
Euro-Atlantic policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, Dodik certainly 
expects the support of the Russian Federation in case of a referendum on 
the status of the BiH entity the Republic of Srpska (BETA 2014).
Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, Macedonia has not taken any 
official stance that would actually condemn the behaviour of the Russian 
Federation and there was no serious discussion on the introduction of 
possible sanctions (Kuzmanovski 2014). It is clear that this country is trying 
to keep withholding its position towards the crisis in Ukraine and is not 
ready to support the European sanctions. 
On the other hand, Macedonia has succeeded in adopting the Law 
on Classification of Information and the Law on Implementation of 
International Restrictive Measures (sanctions) in 2011, and the level of 
harmonization of its foreign policy with the EU in this area was 99% (2011), 
100% (2012), 94% (2013) and 73% (2014) (European Commission 2011d: 77–
78 / European Commission 2012d: 66–67 / European Commission 2013d: 
57–58 / European Commission 2014d: 59). Not joining the EU sanctions 
against the Russian Federation has certainly diminished the earlier positive 
trend of the harmonization process. However, it is important to note that 
Macedonia supported the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
No. 68/262 in late March 2014, condemning the referendum of pro-Russian 
separatists in Crimea (United Nations 2014). Also, Macedonia participates 
in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Since 2011, and after gaining candidate status, Serbia tried to do as much 
as possible to harmonize its foreign policy with the EU’s CFSP. Thus, for 
example, in 2012 this percentage was 99%, in 2013 — 89% and in 2014 — 
62% (European Commission 2012e: 62–63 / European Commission 2013e: 
59 / European Commission 2014e: 61). The reports on Serbia’s progress 
in 2012 and 2013 emphasize that Serbia intends to harmonize its own 
7 See the web site of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina — www.izbori.ba.
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foreign policy with the CFSP. Moreover, the positive role of this country 
in international organizations was pointed out, as well as the country’s 
participation in peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the EU (Ibid). 
After the formal beginning of negotiations with the EU on 21 January 2014, 
the explanatory screening related to Chapter 31 was held on 15 July 2014, 
while bilateral screening was scheduled for 16 October 2014 (Kancelarija 
za evropske integracije Vlade Republike Srbije 2014). However, the report 
on Serbia’s progress in 2014 noted that the earlier trend of harmonization 
of foreign policy with the CFSP was reduced and should be increased 
(European Commission 2014e: 61). It was also noted that it was necessary 
to adopt a law on the introduction of restrictive measures. 
Since the beginning of 2014 there has been an evident lower level of 
acceptance of the normative acts of the EU in the field of CFSP due to 
the Ukrainian crisis and a sort of “artificial concordance” with the Russian 
Federation, which has not been explicitly clarified to the EU nor the Russian 
Federation.8 This percentage for 2014 is 62%, which does not correspond to 
the level of progress of Serbia in the process of accession to the European 
Union. In addition, Serbia is in a very difficult social and economic 
situation that does not allow, taking into account the dependence of 
the Serbian economy on the EU, the search for alternative partners and 
the development of additional close relations with the Russian Federation 
(Petrović, Đukanović 2012: 183–227). However, the Serbian political elite 
is still trying to maintain the illusion of extremely intense relationships with 
both Brussels and Moscow.9 The room for manoeuvring is narrowing down, 
keeping in mind the intention of Serbia to accelerate European integration 
(Večernje novosti 2014). However, Serbia insists on “brotherly” relations 
with the Russian Federation, although its modern political history does not 
confirm such a situation, especially after the First Serbian Uprising (1804), 
as well as during most of the 19th and 20th centuries. At the same time, 
by the decision of its own political elite Serbia “tied itself” to the Russian 
Federation due to a number of unfavourable energy arrangements 
8 The abovementioned was confirmed by a quote by Sergey Lavrov from an interview given to Dnevni avazu – Erol 
Avdović, E., 2014. Šef ruske diplomatije Sergey Lavrov za - Avaz’: Moskva protiv NATO-a na Balkanu. op. cit. Quote - 
“When asked how he sees the fact that Serbia ... is moving toward membership in the European Union, Lavrov told 
us that “politicians in power in Belgrade regularly assure the official Moscow that it will not have a negative impact 
on Serbia’s relations with Russia’’ and “And when we think about cooperation between Serbia and the EU, then we 
believe that Serbia should find such an arrangement with Brussels that will not harm our cooperation nor the level of 
trade exchange and investment.”
9 Johannes Hahn, the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Negotiations on Enlargement also believes that such a 
foreign policy course of Serbia is neither sustainable nor acceptable for the Union.
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concluded under worse conditions compared to other countries in the 
region (sales of the Petroleum Industry of Serbia in 2008, the arrangement 
regarding the South Stream pipeline, etc.) (RTV B92 2014). 
Such, to some extent, mythical understanding of relations between 
Serbia and Russia is supported by circles around the current president 
of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, while Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is more 
oriented towards cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany 
as the leading country of the European Union (Radio Slobodna Evropa 
— Regionalni servis, 2014b). It is particularly important that the Serbian 
Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, publicly stated that Serbia supports the 
integrity of Ukraine, including annexed Crimea (this was also stated in the 
progress report for 2014 — European Commission 2014e: 61) while Nikolić’s 
reference to Tito in light of a “post-modern policy of non-alignment”, that 
is, keeping equidistance both towards the Russian Federation and the EU, 
will not bring a desirable foreign policy position to the country, nor an 
acceleration of European integration (L.G. 2014 / TANJUG, RTS 2014).
In addition, on 16 October 2014, the president of the Russian Federation 
Vladimir Putin visited Belgrade, as officially stated, on the occasion of 
the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the city. However, on the same 
occasion seven bilateral agreements were concluded yet, although 
expected, the agreement on the staff of the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian 
Emergency Center in Niš was not concluded. Putin’s visit to the capital 
of Serbia abounded in recognizable iconography on the military parade 
particularly organized for this occasion, and he was awarded the highest 
civil decoration. Such a visit of the Russian president, however, did not 
cause significant adverse assessments by the Brussels administration.
Serbia will be chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Srbije 2014). In the context of 
developments in Eastern Europe, primarily in Ukraine, this fact may 
further hamper an otherwise quite complicated foreign position of the 
country. This is particularly evident taking into account the different levels 
of aspiration of both Western countries, and the Russian Federation in 
relation to Serbia, regarding the above mentioned chairing. 
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Conclusion
It is obvious that all the dynamism, complexity and unpredictability of 
contemporary international relations and global politics is not possible to 
encompass in only one theoretical direction or its numerous internal varieties. 
When it comes to the Ukrainian crisis, and the relationship between the Western 
Balkan countries towards the CFSP, it is obvious that the analysis requires taking 
into account the domination of both (neo)institutionalism and (neo)realism, 
as well as their internal synergy to the extent possible. Thus, research based on 
these two theoretical directions suggests the following conclusion/s. 
The process of European integration of the Western Balkan countries has 
accelerated since 1999 and fifteen years after the introduction of the 
stabilization and association process. Today, all countries in the region, with 
the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, are candidates for EU 
membership, while Montenegro and Serbia started negotiations. In this regard, 
one of the chapters refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union. If one looks at the facts that from 2011 to 2014 most countries 
in the region significantly harmonized with the EU’s CFSP, the current year 
denies this and to some extent disputes it, at least when it comes to Serbia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, Albania, Kosovo 
and Montenegro have extensively harmonized their foreign policy with the 
EU’s CFSP, which they specifically confirmed by supporting and introducing 
restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.
Still, it must be emphasized that the countries in the region, primarily in terms 
of energy and the supply of gas, are very much connected to the Russian 
Federation, and that the political influence of this country is being re-established 
in the region (Weber, Basseuner 2014). This is especially evident in Serbia, as 
well as in the BiH entity — Republic of Srpska. The European Union, however, is 
trying to win over all the countries of the Western Balkans regarding support of 
sanctions already imposed in several rounds against the Russian Federation, 
due to the Ukrainian crisis. 
In the next period, there will be many problems related to how the Western 
Balkan countries will accept any liability arising from the harmonization with the 
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EU’s CFSP. The policy of so-called equidistance towards Brussels and Moscow, 
as well as other non-European centers of world politics, will not be sustainable in 
the long term for countries in the region, especially Serbia, which according to 
some announcements plans to fully harmonize its legislation with the European 
Union by 2019, as well as to fulfil the larger part of the obligations relating to 
the pre-accession period. Thus, the policy of the new “non-alignment” will not 
bring to its promoters the desired results on the foreign policy front. On the 
contrary, it can only further complicate the process of European integration 
and possibly tighten relations with Brussels.
It is clear that further harmonization of foreign policy with the EU’s CFSP will 
not pose a problem for Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo, unless some drastic 
changes in the political relations and power occur, and/or right-wing political 
parties strengthen. On the contrary, it seems that Chapter 31 will be one of the 
easiest compared to e.g. Chapters 23 and 24 (Justice and Home Affairs), with 
which the negotiation process starts.
Certain reserves about the very dynamics of the negotiation process in 
Montenegro, Serbia, and in perspective ― Albania, should be preserved 
considering the announcements saying that in the next short-term period (5 
years) there will be no new expansion, as well as that the negotiation process 
for most member states that joined after 2004 lasted several years (Maksimović 
2014). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the countries in the region should 
not continue to work on fundamental reforms and the harmonization of their 
political and economic system with the European Union.
It is important to add, in conclusion, that the countries of the Western 
Balkans need to solve a number of bilateral problems. This will be one 
of the obligations in the process of joining the European Union and the 
one closely monitored. The dialogue started four years ago between 
the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina must continue and lead to a 
better mutual relationship. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to lag in 
European integration and in the next period will continue to be burdened 
with solving domestic issues related to its own organization and economic 
consolidation. Thus, the sending of confusing and contradictory foreign 
policy signals from Sarajevo will continue in the future. When it comes 
to Macedonia, there will also be no substantial progress in Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the country, taking into account a nearly two and a half 
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decade-long dispute with Greece which, despite mediation of the EU 
and the US, will not be solved soon.
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